In 1970, What Was Created to Discourage the Development of Nuclear Weapons Technology?

Declassified Documents Show Henry Kissinger's Major Role in the 1974 Initiative That Created the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Kissinger Favored Efforts to Curb Nuclear Proliferation in Concert with Other Powers, only Did Not Want U.S. to "Go Charging Around the Earth, Like Don Quixote"

State Section Directorate Warned That New Nuclear-armed Nations or "Even Subnational Groups" Could "Threaten the U.s. with Nuclear Violence," Which Would Crave "Extensive and Costly Restructuring" of the U.Due south. Defence Posture"

New Documents Disclose the Cardinal Part of Not-NPT Signatory France in Making the NSG Possible Simply Also in Shaping Guidelines on Lowest Common Denominator Footing

Henry Kissinger played a slightly reluctant but even so highly influential office in establishing the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in the mid-1970s, motivated equally by business organisation about nuclear proliferation and a desire to continue U.Due south. officials from "charging around the world, like Don Quixote," according to documents posted today by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Projection. The newly declassified records too draw French republic's cooperative part in establishing the NSG, despite French concerns to be seen as pursuing an contained policy on nonproliferation.

During the first months of 1975, when Secretary of Land Henry Kissinger's Country Department was working with other allies to organize the Nuclear Suppliers Group, information technology was difficult to make headway with France, a key nuclear exporter which was reluctant to bring together the endeavor to regulate exports of sensitive nuclear applied science and materials. The French rejected the comprehensive nuclear safeguards that Washington favored because they "did non want to be defendant of acting with nuclear suppliers to gang upward on non-NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] parties and fifty-fifty some NPT countries." Reacting to the U.S. proposal to regulate sensitive nuclear exports to unstable countries, French diplomats argued that information technology was on "dangerous footing" and that imposing such constraints raised "political dangers." All the same, the French had their own concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities and when Kissinger made assurances, they came on lath the NSG.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group has played a meaning function in the history of the nonproliferation system since the 1970s, although the concerns raised by the French indicate why it was a controversial project very early on. The daze created past the Indian "peaceful nuclear explosion" in May 1974 raised questions about the safeguarding of sensitive nuclear technology. With growing contest for sales of nuclear reactors and equipment, U.S. government officials worried about an emerging nuclear proliferation take a chance that could destabilize international relations and damage U.Southward. interests. Appropriately, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger authorized a secret diplomatic procedure to create a high-level group that would found criteria for preventing the diversion of sensitive nuclear technology and materials into nuclear weapons product. Declassified U.Southward. government documents shed low-cal on the U.S. authorities part in the cosmos of the NSG during 1974–1975. The other founding members were governments on both sides of the Cold War line: Canada, French republic, Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

Sometimes known as the "London Club," afterwards the location of its headquarters, the purpose of the NSG has been to fill a gap in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. The Treaty stipulated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would provide safeguards for exports of nuclear supplies but it did non create any arrangements for discouraging nuclear exporters from equipping non-nuclear weapons states with sensitive technology. Moreover, NPT Commodity III covered exports of equipment only did not specify engineering as such. Once the NPT had been ratified by many states, big and small, a Swiss academic, Professor Claude Zangger, established a working group of nuclear exporters to develop a trigger list of supplies requiring safeguards. The Zangger Committee, however, did not include applied science in its trigger list. That, and France's non-membership—it had refused to sign the NPT—raised diplomatic problems that the administration of President Gerald R. Ford had to resolve.

Among the documents in today's publication:

A "memcon" of Kissinger'southward chat with Canadian Foreign Minister Mitchell Abrupt later on the Indian "peaceful nuclear explosion" in May 1974. Canada had sold Bharat the nuclear reactor that helped produce plutonium for the exam, but Kissinger said that U.S. safeguards were besides "lousy" (Washington had fabricated heavy water available to India)
• A memorandum where Kissinger was given the pick of a "low visibility" meeting involving the "well-nigh advanced nuclear industrial states" or "a larger, well publicized briefing involving numerous other states" He chose the "more restrictive" option, probably to make the meeting more "manageable."
The initial U.Due south. proposal for nuclear suppliers' guidelines, including "special restraints" over exports of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies and "stringent" weather where nuclear exports could exacerbate instability and conflict.
Records of U.S.-French bilateral meetings where French officials expressed fears of joining a "cartel" of nuclear "haves," beingness "isolated" at a suppliers' briefing, beingness "pressured to prefer unacceptable policies," or made to expect like a "renegade" on nuclear proliferation issues.
A bulletin to Kissinger expressing business concern that news of a loosely safeguarded Brazilian-W German nuclear deal made it urgent to move forward with a suppliers group which included the French, so that such problems could exist discussed.
Messages between Kissinger and French Strange Minister Jean Sauvagnargues, including Kissinger'due south commitment that suppliers group agreements would be based on consensus, enabling France to join without fear of grouping pressures.
Memoranda on the Canadian-French controversy over "full scope safeguards," during which Washington stayed on the sidelines and then as not to isolate the French, who opposed total-scope equally part of the NPT, which they had refused to sign.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, canonical in autumn 1975, which called for "restraint" in the transfer of sensitive technologies and regular consultations between suppliers, including over "sensitive cases" to "ensure that transfer does not contribute to risks of disharmonize or instability, and included a "trigger list" of items that would crave safeguards past the International Atomic Free energy Bureau.

An assessment of the 1975 nuclear suppliers' guidelines, in which Assistant Secretary of State for Pol-Military Diplomacy George Vest wrote that they "served to shut many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients," but could non prevent "indigenous" development of nuclear weapons capabilities.

Assistant Secretary of State for Politician-War machine Affairs George Vest, played a fundamental role in the founding of the Nuclear Suppliers Grouping. Photo from Yet Pictures Branch, National Archives, RG 59-Then, box 18.

Convincing French republic to participate in the suppliers group was a central problem; the French had refused to sign the NPT but were condign more than concerned almost the spread of nuclear capabilities. Yet, as noted, they were also concerned nearly appearances—that governments without a nuclear infrastructure would see the suppliers grouping as a "cartel" designed to go on them down. Indeed, this became a pregnant objection to the Nuclear Suppliers' Grouping over the years. Withal, from the U.Southward. standpoint, French involvement in the project was crucial because the Japanese and West Germans were unlikely to join without the French. Afterwards the French government had assented, the suppliers group began coming together although information technology would operate on a "lowest common denominator" basis in order to go along France from existence "isolated" on fundamental upshot such equally total-telescopic safeguards. Pre-existing agreements on sensitive cases (due east.grand., Brazil-West Federal republic of germany or Pakistan-French republic) remained subjects of bilateral discussions.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group started out, and remains, an essentially voluntary international arrangement. From the outset, its guidelines did non have the force of international law and depended on action by the member states to discover and implement them. Nonetheless, the NSG became an important and indelible institution in the nuclear nonproliferation system, supplementing and supporting both the NPT and the IAEA.[one]

During 1976, the NSG expanded membership to broaden support for its objectives. Still, in 1978, it stopped meeting because of internal differences over the next steps, such every bit the role of total-telescopic safeguards. The guidelines, which became public in 1978 when the IAEA published them, served as a reference tool for nuclear export policies, but Washington pressed the other NSG members to tacitly expand the trigger list by seeking prohibitions of specific dual-use exports bound for nuclear programs in such countries as Pakistan. It was not until the 1990 Gulf War, when the West discovered the extent of Iraq's nuclear program, that a consensus developed for tougher nuclear export controls. In this context, the NSG began meeting again and expanded its membership farther. Information technology besides adopted full-scope safeguards, but years afterward granted India an exception that haunts the nonproliferation regime.[ii]

That the NSG emerged when information technology did and in the form information technology took was due in office to Henry Kissinger's part, not to the lowest degree his success in securing French involvement. However, as an NSG founding father, Kissinger barely discusses nonproliferation, much less the Group'due south creation, in his three volumes of memoirs. With his focus on U.S.-Soviet crises and affairs, Common salt I and Two, the wars in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and normalization of relations with Communist china, perhaps he sees the NSG as rather pocket-size change. Moreover, Kissinger may have establish writing nearly nonproliferation issues somewhat tricky. He and President Richard Nixon had been dismissive of the NPT, but Kissinger changed course during 1974-1975 and that would have to be explained. Moreover, nonproliferation policy during the 1960s and 1970s cannot be discussed without tackling sensitive questions such every bit the Israeli nuclear program and why Kissinger had acquiesced in it, in contrast to taking a more activist approach to check Pakistani nuclear plans during 1975-1976. Perhaps, Kissinger concluded that this was one outcome that resisted his stiff interest in using history to justify his record of diplomacy.

Documents 1A-B: Early on Proposals

A: Report, National Security Council Nether Secretaries' Committee, "Action Plan for Implementing NSDM 235," 25 March 1974, Secret

B: National Security Decision Memorandum 255, Henry Kissinger to Secretary of Defense et al., " Security and Other Aspects of the Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries," 3 June 1974, Secret

Sources: A: Richard Chiliad. Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, H-242, NSDM-235 [1 of 2], B: Digital National Security Annal

Before the Indian test, an interagency NSC sub-committee was exploring the problem of safeguards for sensitive nuclear exports. The problem was that an existing grouping, the Zangger Committee based on NPT membership, did not have a broad enough membership or scope to manage the problem. It had developed a trigger list of nuclear supplies that required IAEA safeguards but the list did not include reprocessing or enrichment technologies considering NPT commodity 3 but covered supplies, not technology. Toward this cease, the Under Secretaries Committee proposed "talks with other suppliers of technology and equipment in the reprocessing and enrichment fields on desirable new constraints or guidelines that should be followed."

One trouble that the report brought up was that French republic did not belong to the Zangger Commission. This raised the possibility that "suppliers may not attach to the Committee'south recommendations if there is serious concern that France volition undercut them by selling Trigger List items, without safeguards, to [non-nuclear weapons states] not party to the NPT." The Under Secretaries hoped that French republic could be persuaded to follow the Zangger Committee'south recommendations, just this was a diplomatic problem that would require higher level intervention.

After the Indian test, the agencies moved forward in developing an action plan on the nuclear supply problem and related problems which Henry Kissinger signed off on in NSDM 255. Amongst other measures, Kissinger endorsed consultations with suppliers to constitute "mutual principles regarding the supply of sensitive enrichment technology or equipment" and encouraging multinational frameworks for "enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing facilities." Through multinational arrangements, it would exist possible to discourage the proliferation of national nuclear enrichment and reprocessing plants.

Certificate ii: Memorandum of conversation, "Indian Nuclear Explosion; World Food Conference; Pacific Coast Tankers; NATO Declaration; Heart E; Trade Bill," eighteen June 1974

Source: National Athenaeum and Records Assistants, Department of State Records, Record Group 59 [RG 59], records of Henry A. Kissinger, 1973-1977 [hereinafter Kissinger records], box 8, June 1974 Nodis Memcons, also on Digital National Security Archive

Canada's safeguards had failed to prevent Republic of india from converting spent fuel from the CANDU reactor into plutonium. Kissinger acknowledged to Canadian Foreign Government minister Mitchell Precipitous that U.S. safeguards had likewise proven to be "lousy," failing to preclude Bharat from using U.Due south.-supplied heavy h2o for its nuclear activities. Abrupt asked Kissinger how the proliferation of nuclear technology could be prevented and what should be said to the Argentines and the Egyptians, who were also seeking to use nuclear free energy. Simply Kissinger evidently had no answer.

Document three: Transcript, Nether Secretary Sisco's Principals' and Regionals' Staff Meeting, Fri, June 21, 1974, 3 p.m., 26 June 1974, Secret, excerpts

Source: RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of Land Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973-1977, box four

As well encouraging interest in a close expect at nuclear export policy were negotiations, pre-dating the Indian exam, over nuclear reactor sales to Israel, Egypt, and Islamic republic of iran. Chairing the meeting in Kissinger's absence, Nether Secretary of State Joseph Sisco expressed dismay that nuclear nonproliferation had lost loftier-level support during the Nixon administration.

Document 4: Memorandum of Chat, "Free energy; North Sea Oil; Foreign Assistance; Nuclear Non-Proliferation; CSCE; Trade Nib," vii July 1974, Secret

Source: RG 59, Office of the Counselor, 1955-77 (Helmut Sonnenfeldt), box 4, United kingdom 1974

Near the finish of a discussion of non-proliferation policy with British Strange Secretary James Callaghan [pages xvi-18], Kissinger realized he needed to tackle the problem of nuclear exports and asked his adjutant, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, to arrange a staff meeting.

Certificate 5: Executive Secretary George Due south. Springsteen to Secretarial assistant of State Kissinger, "Belittling Staff Coming together," 11 July 1974, enclosing "Discussion Paper on U.Due south. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," Secret

Source: RG 59, Executive Secretariat Records, Memorandums of the Executive Secretariat, 1964-1975, box 12, S/South Staff Coming together

Prepared by Jerome Kahan and Charles Van Doren, respectively with the Land Department's Policy Planning Staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, this report provided a comprehensive take on the problem of nuclear proliferation and the state of U.Due south. nonproliferation policy. Among the specific bug reviewed were the status of the NPT, export control issues, the trouble of "peaceful nuclear explosions," the implications of the Indian test, and long-term steps for decision-making the proliferation of nuclear capabilities. . The authors saw a compelling security requirement: "The basis for our non-proliferation interest is the assessment that the danger of nuclear war also every bit earth instability would significantly increment with an unrestrained spread of nuclear weapons." Moreover, the proliferation of nuclear capabilities would give nations a "'sense of greater independence, thus complicating international affairs and diminishing American influence." Finally, new nuclear-armed nations or "even subnational groups" could "threaten the U.s. with nuclear violence," which would crave "extensive and costly restructuring" of the U.S. defence posture.

Creating a forum for nuclear exporters to develop mutual policies was a major recommendation, but the newspaper on controls over nuclear exports pointed to a significant problem: "The greatest potential obstacle to effective export controls in the nuclear field has been the lack of cooperation by France." On 12 July Kissinger met with his staff to hash out these issues. No record of the meeting has surfaced, but a few weeks later Policy Planning Staff Manager Winston Lord reminded Kissinger: "Last fourth dimension nosotros agreed in principle that there was something y'all could practise nigh this problem, it wasn't hopeless" [Come across document 7].

Document 6: Memorandum to the Secretarial assistant of Country from ACDA Director Fred Ikle and Policy Planning Staff Director Winston Lord, "Analytical Staff Meeting on Non-Proliferation Strategy," 31 July 1974, Secret

Source: RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Managing director'southward Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977 [hereinafter PPS], box 344, July 1974

To assistance Kissinger gear up for a follow-up discussion, ACDA and Land Department officials prepared a "Non-Proliferation: Strategy and Activity Programme" to help guide policy. An important proposal was for "loftier level political approaches to central exporting countries to enlist their back up for safeguarding transfers of nuclear materials." While Washington had to approach a number of nuclear exporters, consultations with France "constitute the most crucial and urgent footstep to be taken." In light of France's condition equally a pregnant nuclear supplier but an NPT hold-out, the problem was convincing the French that cooperation was in their interest. They would not want the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to erode their status every bit a nuclear power, nor would they favor the proliferation of enrichment capabilities that would undermine their ain investments in enrichment facilities. Moreover, Washington had leverage as a supplier of HEU to France. This was an "urgent thing."

Certificate 7: Transcript, "The Secretary's Analytical Staff Meeting on Non-Proliferation, Friday, August ii, 1974 three:00 p.m," ii August 1974, Secret

Source: RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of Land Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973-1977, box 4

Kissinger presided over an important staff meeting in early August where he made a conclusion to go ahead with the suppliers' projection, beginning with approaches to Moscow and Paris. While noting that the U.S., as a sponsor of the NPT, had a "special responsibility" to curb nuclear proliferation, Kissinger did not believe that it had a unique responsibility: "The fact of the affair is that there is no nuclear country whose nuclear capability volition threaten us before it threatens fifty other countries." Kissinger observed that he had a "reluctance to have the United States go charging around the world, similar Don Quixote, for every conceivable trouble . . . when there are other countries whose interest in information technology ought to be fifty-fifty greater." Washington had to work with other countries and have them "share some of the responsibility." Notwithstanding, "we will however wind upwards in a leading position." He wanted an arroyo made to Moscow; further, considering of France'southward importance, "I might want to talk quietly to the French and tell them what is coming. And if they accept an overwhelming desire for preliminary bilateral talks with united states, maybe we will do information technology." He wanted to "think through how to do this."

Document viii: Memorandum to the Secretary of State from Fred Ikle and Winston Lord, "U.Due south. Policy on Nuclear Proliferation," 26 August 1974, with 29 November 1974 cover memorandum, Secret

Source: PPS, box 348, Nov. 1974

While U.South. nonproliferation strategy focused on several bug, such every bit ratification of the NPT past key countries, interest in a briefing of major nuclear suppliers solidified. According to Kissinger'southward advisers, "A conference of nuclear industrial states offers an opportunity for realizing a coordinated arroyo in placing effective controls, including safeguards and security measures, over transfers of commercial nuclear equipment and materials." When given the choice of a "low visibility" meeting involving the "most advanced nuclear industrial states," and a larger, well publicized conference involving numerous other states, Kissinger chose the "more than restrictive" option, probably to "enhance both the manageability of the briefing and the prospects for reaching consensus among the current major suppliers."

Documents 9A-C: Bringing the Soviets In

A: Memorandum to the Secretary of Land from Lord and Ikle, "Consultations with the Soviets on Non-Proliferation Strategy,"18 September 1974, Secret

B: Memorandum to the Secretary of State from "Talks on Reactor Safeguards and Related Matters with the Soviets on October 15," 5 October 1974

C: Land Department telegram 228213 to U.South. Embassy Moscow, "Nuclear Safeguards Consultations," 17 October 1974

Sources: A: State Department release from P-reels; B: PPS, box 369, WL Sensitive Non-Red china; C: National Athenaeum Access to Archival Databases On-line collections, State Department telegrams for 1974 and other years (time to come AAD)

The Soviet Union was not yet a major nuclear exporter, but they had potential and every bit a major co-sponsor of the NPT had followed nonproliferation norms in their nuclear dealings. Kissinger and his advisers took it for granted that Moscow should be involved in a suppliers' projection at the outset although they were not certain how the Soviets would react to being the only Communist country in a group of U.S. allies. Washington could lessen this problem by assuring Moscow that the initial group would exist the "nucleus" of a larger grouping that could include Soviet allies.

Once Kissinger canonical an approach, State Department officials prepared the substance of communications with Moscow, which included a bones five-signal newspaper (See certificate 8B, Tab B) constituting proposed "undertakings" for a suppliers' group. The proposed guidelines for nuclear exporters included no "peaceful nuclear explosives" for non-nuclear states, IAEA safeguards for nuclear supplies, and "special restraints" over exports of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies, including comprehensive safeguards and multinational plants. Moreover, for regions where nuclear exports could exacerbate instability and conflict, suppliers would agree to "stringent" weather condition. On 17 October 1974, the State Department took the first step to bringing the Soviets in by sending a telegram about the project to the diplomatic mission in Moscow.

Document 10: Memorandum from Winston Lord, Fred Iklé, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt to the Secretarial assistant, "Follow-up with French on Nuclear Export Controls,"17 Oct 1974, Undercover

Source: PPS, box 369, WL Sensitive Non-Prc

With an approach to the Soviets already in the works, Kissinger's top directorate emphasized the importance of a parallel approach to the French, given their axis to the prospects for a suppliers' group. While no one could be certain whether the French would abandon their "case-past-case" approach to nuclear exports, the advisers believed that the French disliked nuclear proliferation and wished to remain the only nuclear weapons state in Western Europe. Moreover, their dependency on U.S. HEU for their civilian nuclear program might reinforce their interest in strengthening U.Southward.-French relations. By mid-October 1974, the French were giving signals that they were open up to dialogue on export controls but the advisers believed that an approach to Paris was becoming more urgent in low-cal of recent intelligence that Paris was signing contracts on nuclear export deals, probably a reference to Islamic republic of pakistan and Due south Korea.

Certificate eleven: Memorandum from Williams H. Luers, Executive Secretariat, to Winston Lord and Fred Iklé, 22 Oct 1974, with 2 memoranda to Kissinger attached, Clandestine

Source: PPS, box 369, WL Sensitive Not-Red china

Kissinger agreed that in his absence Acting Secretary of Country Robert Ingersoll and ACDA Director Fred Iklé should meet with French Administrator Kosciusko-Morizet and that the British, Germans, and Canadians should receive copies of the five-indicate newspaper, and also be informed of the approaches to the French and the Soviets.

Document 12: George H. Springsteen, Jr., Executive Secretary, to Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, "Briefing Paper on Non-Proliferation," 21 December 1974, Secret

Source: Country Department release from P-reels

In the course of a background newspaper on the nuclear proliferation trouble and policy options, the State Department updated the White Business firm on the state of play of the nuclear suppliers' initiative: the British, the Canadians, and the Soviets had agreed to attend a coming together; the Germans would concur "if all key suppliers" (France) accustomed; and the Japanese, who had besides been asked, had non responded. The French had not given an answer and bilateral discussions would have place to go over the bug.

Documents 13A-Eastward: Bringing the French In

A. Memorandum to the Deputy Secretarial assistant from Winston Lord, "Next Steps for the Nuclear Suppliers' Conference," 16 January 1975, with memoranda attached, cloak-and-dagger

B. Memorandum of conversation, "French Participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Conference," [Distribution List Attached], 24 February 1975

C. State Department telegram 65502 to U.S. Consulate, Jerusalem, "Action Memorandum: Nuclear Suppliers' Conference," 23 March 1975

D. Country Department memorandum, "Nuclear Suppliers Conference/French Participation,"26 March 1975, Hush-hush, with background papers attached, Cloak-and-dagger

E. Memorandum from George S. Vest, Bureau of European Affairs, to Secretary of State, "French Foreign Minister'due south Response on Nuclear Suppliers Meeting," 9 April 1975, with groundwork papers attached, Hole-and-corner

F. Land Department telegram 90533 to U.S. Embassy Paris, "Exploratory Meeting of Nuclear Suppliers,"19 April 1975, Hole-and-corner

Source: A: RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977, box 369, WL Sensitive Non-Prc, B-D: : State Department releases from P-reels; E: AAD

Some months of secret talks were required for Kissinger and his advisers to persuade the French government to nourish the preliminary suppliers' meeting in London in April 1975. Non knowing that French President Valerie Giscard d'Estaing had become more worried about nuclear proliferation and more interested in trying to adjourn it, U,S. officials were pleased to learn that the French had moved "closer . . . to responsible behavior" on nuclear exports. President Ford began the process by asking d'Estaing, during the Martinique summit in December 1974, to approve French participation in a suppliers' group. While the French were generally receptive because they did not want to be "isolated," they even so wanted to chart their ain course in developing nonproliferation policy.

It took some wrangling over a variety of problems, including the five U.S. points, which the French did not fully accept, to get them involved in a suppliers' project. Later on French officials observed that what would emerge would "be the least common denominator," State Department Political leader-Military Affairs Manager George Vest acknowledged that was "the nature of such activities." Compromises or not, Vest and his colleagues wanted to motion forrad. Adding urgency to getting the French involved was growing U.South. business organization that W German safeguards for the sale of nuclear technology to Brazil were too loose. If the French did not participate, neither would the West Germans. To ensure French involvement, Kissinger wrote Foreign Government minister Jean Sauvagnargues that he saw enough "mutual understanding" on important issues to provide a basis for French participation. He assured Sauvagnargues that he did non want any of the "major suppliers to exist isolated" and that at that place was a need for consensus and" harmonization" on policy.

In reply the French foreign government minister asked for assurances and recognition that French concessions were the "limits of our possibilities." For example, understanding should exist by consensus, no decisions would exist retroactive (that is, not utilise to contracts that the French had already signed), and meetings should be confidential. On 18 April, Kissinger met with the French ambassador and provided the necessary assurances, which he wrote up in a letter to Sauvagnargues non long before the suppliers met in London on 25 Apr. Kissinger shaped the future of the NSG by writing that agreements would be based on consensus, decisions would non exist retroactive, and the suppliers meetings would be "informal and confidential." This arrangement bodacious that the suppliers' group would operate on a lowest-common-denominator basis, just in that location was no choice considering French participation was vital.

Documents 14 A-D: The April Meeting and Its Consequences

A: Briefing Paper, "The Nuclear Suppliers Briefing," circa June 1975

B: Memorandum from Thomas O. Enders to the Secretary, "Typhoon Letter to Sauvagnargues," 14 June 1975, Secret

C: U.Due south. Embassy London telegram 9376 to State Department, "Nuclear Export Policy: Bilaterals with FRG," xix June 1975, Secret

D: Briefing Paper prepared for the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, "Status Summary of Nuclear Suppliers Conference and Relevant Bilateral Give-and-take", July 1975, Clandestine

Sources: A: RG 59, Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, Reports, and Minutes, box 217A, Land Visit of President Scheel June 1975; b: PPS, box 356, June 1-15, 1975, C: AAD. D: FOIA release

State Department records of the April coming together in London have yet to surface in the archives, just the gist of what happened can be parsed out from other documents. Then can the results of a follow-upward meeting in mid-June 1975. The U.Southward. delegation agreed to develop a policy paper that would accept into account French and other views and so as to reach agreement on the most "stringent" safeguards possible. A fundamental but divisive effect was whether safeguards should utilise to the entire nuclear fuel cycle (later known equally "total-telescopic" safeguards). Another issue was whether multinational auspices for reprocessing and enrichment plants should be mandatory or a matter of discretion past a supplier land. On these matters and others, the French position was central.

Documents 15A-Due east: The Struggle over Total Scope Safeguards

A. Memorandum from George S. Vest to Secretarial assistant of State, "September 16-17 Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting. " 23 September 1975, Underground, excised copy, under appeal

B. U.South. Embassy London telegram 14177 to State Department, "French-U.S. Consultations on Nuclear Suppliers Meeting," 15 September 1975

C. George Vest to Mr. Sonnenfeldt, "British Comprehensive Safeguards Initiative re Suppliers Conference," x October 1975, Confidential

D. Briefing Paper, "Nuclear Suppliers Conference," circa 15 October 1975

Secretary's Trip to Ottawa, xiv-15 October 1975

East. Memorandum of conversation, "Visit of Secretarial assistant of State and Mrs. Kissinger to Canada; Luncheon at 24 Sussex Drive," fifteen October 1975, Secret

Sources: A and E: State Section release from P-reels; B: Declassification release from AAD; C: RG 59, Role of the Counselor, 1955-1977, box seven, FSE 3 Nuclear Suppliers Conference; D: RG 59, Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, Reports, and Minutes, box 223, Secretary's Trip to Ottawa, fourteen-15 October 1975

[Note: Drawing on the declassified record, the editor has filled in many of the land names deleted by Land Department reviewers from document A.]

The September 1975 meeting of the suppliers' grouping brought out a conflict over a decisive issue, whether supplying countries should require recipient countries to place all nuclear facilities under safeguards or require them only for the applied science and supplies at issue in the contract ("project safeguards"). The Canadians strongly supported the quondam, "full scope safeguards" (their terminology, which caught on), which the French saw every bit "tantamount to imposing NPT obligations"—a reference to the Treaty'south Article III--which they would not accept. Washington had included the substance of full-telescopic safeguards in the original v-point paper merely Kissinger would not go against the French and run a risk the hard-won understanding that had brought them into the group. A recently declassified telegram (document 15B) illuminates the U.S.-French dialogue over safeguards and other provisions in the nuclear suppliers' guidance. Arguing that total-scope safeguards was "alien to [their] philosophy," the French suggested that a "traditional estimation of the contamination principle (i.due east., requiring safeguards on any materials produced in exported facilities)," would brand it possible to achieve "the applied equivalent" of the Canadian proposal.

Ottawa relented only an interesting and sometimes confused conversation between Kissinger and Prime Minister Pierre-Elliot Trudeau suggested the latter was still interested in full-scope safeguards. Kissinger might not have been certain what Trudeau meant: "an effort must be made," he said, even though Washington was non supporting Ottawa on this indicate. Trudeau highlighted an of import problem: the "part of crass business interests" which meet the proliferation problem as "insoluble" and therefore press to "get ahead on a business concern basis."

Document 16A-B: Concluding Agreement on Guidelines

A. Memorandum from George South. Springsteen, Executive Secretary, to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, "Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines," 31 December 1975, Hush-hush

B. George Vest to the Secretary, "Nuclear Suppliers Status Report," 27 Jan 1976, Secret

Sources: A: State Department release from P-reels, B: RG 59, Office of the Counselor, 1955-77, box 7, Nuclear Suppliers Briefing

The first part of document 16A comprises the instructions which the White Firm approved for the September 1975 suppliers' meeting. That event led to some other meeting in early November where the parties hammered out a set of guidelines—marching orders for the suppliers' future decisions. The British tried to piece of work out a compromise on full-telescopic safeguards, but that proved acceptable to none; the best that could be achieved was French agreement to future consideration of full-telescopic. Another contested issue was a U.South. proposal for mandatory supplier involvement in enrichment and reprocessing facilities, just that met strong opposition and was made nonbinding.

At the Nov meeting, the suppliers completed negotiations on guidelines. The terminal agreement, George Vest wrote Kissinger, "served to close many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients." It also put the French and West Germans on record to restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies. Nevertheless, as Vest noted, the guidelines would non prevent "indigenous" development of nuclear capabilities and "unsafeguarded developments" or the acquisition of sensitive technology.

The guidelines did non constitute an international agreement merely a gear up of "mutual policies" that each government would implement accordingly. Basic provisions included agreement to seek assurances past recipients of supplies non to produce nuclear explosive devices, physical security for installations and materials, transfer of trigger list items only under IAEA safeguards, restraint in the transfer of sensitive technologies, facilities and materials, and the encouragement of supplier involvement in, and multinational controls over, sensitive installations. Moreover, suppliers would conduct regular consultations over "sensitive cases" to "ensure that transfer does not contribute to risks of conflict or instability."

Appended to the guidelines was a ii-page "trigger list" based on the Zangger Committee's list, with detailed explanations of items requiring safeguards, from fissile materials to nuclear reactors to "non-nuclear materials for reactors," such as heavy water, deuterium, and enrichment and reprocessing technology/equipment. The latter included, for example, gas centrifuge technology and "know-how" needed to operate a gas centrifuge institute.

Not included in the trigger list was dual-use equipment and technology. This trouble was understood at the fourth dimension and information technology surfaced with a vengeance during 1978–79 when British officials discovered the A. Q. Khan network's attempts to purchase inverters needed to operate gas centrifuge enrichment machines. .

Documents 17A-D: Developments during 1976-1977

A. George Vest to the Secretary, "London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting," 11 June 1976, Confidential

B. London Diplomatic mission telegram 18324 to Country Section, "London Nuclear Suppliers' Coming together, Nov 11 – 12," 12 November 1976, Confidential

C. State Section telegram to U.S. Embassy London et al., "Nuclear Suppliers Coming together, April 28-29, 1977," 3 May 1977, Confidential

D. State Department telegram 222114 to U.S. Embassy Paris, "Nuclear Suppliers Coming together," xv September 1977, Confidential

East. Country Section telegram 229507 to U.S. Embassy London et al., "Nuclear Suppliers Meeting – Assessment," 23 September 1977, Confidential

Sources: A: RG 59, Part of the Counselor, 1955-77, box 7, Nuclear Suppliers Conference, B and C: State State Department and Defense Department FOIA releases respectively; D and F: AAD

To develop broader support for the NSG's mission, the original members expanded their numbers in 1976 to include more than Western and Soviet bloc countries as well as one Cold War neutral. The new members were Kingdom of belgium, Italy, kingdom of the netherlands, Sweden, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Near old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a "long term and stable regime of restraint" on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the West Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.

With the Carter assistants in power in 1977, nuclear nonproliferation policy had greater precedence than under Ford and, reversing the approach that Kissinger had taken, U.S. diplomats lobbied for NSG endorsement of full-scope safeguards. While full-scope had wide support in the group, both the French and the West Germans remained opposed. The Carter assistants tried to persuade the French but they were worried nigh existence "isolated' in the grouping and talked about withdrawing or opposing further meetings because the NSG had "fully achieved" its objectives. Washington persuaded Paris not to withdraw, but the group's futurity was plainly uncertain.

At the September 1977 meeting, the NSG agreed to brand the guidelines available to the IAEA so that information technology could publish them. The State Section had been reluctant to publish them, non least considering they did non include full-scope safeguards, but overriding that was an interest in dispelling Third Globe concerns well-nigh a "hole-and-corner cartel." In Feb 1978, shortly after the IAEA had received the guidelines, information technology made them a public record matter.

[1] For useful studies, run across Ian Anthony, Christer Ahlstrӧm, and Vitaly Fedchenko, Reforming Nuclear Export Controls: The Futurity of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), equally well as Peter van Ham, Managing Nuclear Not-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics, and Policies (New York: Imperial Found of International Diplomacy/Council on Strange Relations, 1994).

[ii] For recent issues facing the NSG, encounter Mark Hibbs, The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Grouphttp://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/thirteen/future-of-nuclear-suppliers-group/8khf (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011).

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Source: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-making-the-nuclear-suppliers-group-1974-1976